beyondbinaryfandomcom-20200215-history
Χάοcracy
.A Χάοcracy (Χάο- = chaos, -cracy = rulership) is a nanodemocratic society in which the regulations are fundamentally uncertain. Instead of setting a fixed constitution, a Χάοcracy simply gives error-bounds on its constitutional expectations for its citizens, and it adjusts continously with new information - like a quantum steering experiment. Journal 1803_14LA-First Draft Ok, so I'm imagining a network where every one "mining" simply has two simple radio transmission "buzz-ers" with a certain bandwidth and some set of "coherence radii" corresponding to how far the transmitter is able to transmit signals at that frequency. The user then also has two "buzz-ees" that vibrate (or stimulate in other ways) the user as they receive buzz "pulses" from other transmitters at this frequency. The buzz-ers and buzz-ees are each programmed to only detect signals encrypted in the signature that they wish to receive. For example: * A buzz-er may send out a signal of 10 buzzes in 20 seconds on a specific frequency fA. * A buzz-ee tuned to fA will pick up this transmission, but is encoded to only vibrate for every second buzz. Hence, it's output forms a 5 buzz sequence of vibrations. * An adversarial member of the network who is also tuned to fA may try to decrypt the message encoded in the pulse sequence, but will not know which pulses are significant. Further, I think the easiest way to do this is to simply set a "pulse trigger" that defines the start of meaningful regions of the pulse sequence and either a set length of time/pulses prior to the end, or a secondary trigger to end the sequence. An adversarial member of the network would have to know the past encoding to solve this problem. So the encoding trigger sequence forms the public key of the communication - anyone using the same encoding system is able to see the transaction. However, in order to generate the transaction and verify the identities of the transactants, we need to involve their private keys. Every transaction that a person signs ... Hmmm... I don't have enough detail yet. But I like the idea of using human impulses as a source of pseudo-randomness. Then each person has their own specific signature and data-miners can try to find coalitions of similar people to harmonise and create rhythmic resonance on the network at specific frequencies. Try to get people to form networks whereby the resonance extends across a whole room, park or even city. Have competitions for which frequency can win the most nodes and earn the most rewards through the 'mining' of resonance. Amplitude of the resonance gains everytime a user is able to buzz in sync with them receiving a buzz. The delay between the two forms the data that miners can mine and use to adjust the timing in which you receive the signal on each hand so that your error-profile can be continuously self-corrected, every miner who correctly adjusts your timing earns a share of the resonance generated. Every miner whose adjustments lead to an anti-correction receive a share of the dissonance generated - a negative miners reward. Nodes can then identify miner's who are adept by their stake as a share-holder of the network's resonance. Higher stake-holders are rewarded with higher percentage of resonance, but offer the most proven algorithms for adjusting your stake. However, different nodes may find different types of adjustments more useful, hence nodes may filter miners based on their own analysis of which adjustment formulae are most efficient at any given time. The nodes then form their own continual re-assessments based on Bayesian interference and steer their own coding to choose the best miners. Hence, the system is self-regulating, with both nodes and miners earning the greatest reward when the market price is fairest. Overpaying for a miner leads to an over-estimation of the miner's algorithm and that miner will lose their staked fee in dissonance (a negative reward). Hence miners are not incentivized to over-state their value. The market will naturally attempt to stabilize prices to match the true value of each adjustment. 1803_15LA_2nd Draft Ok, so rather than waste money on developing some receiver-detector technology. Just use phones and headphones. The phone has an app that flashes with the received signals, and the user is expected to press one of 2 (or more) buttons on their connected headphones in sync with the app. (see Magnetometry) Essentially you get the network to be in sync by penalizing nodes that perform unique press patterns. The next phase, is to also make your delay signature indistinguisable from some other neighbour. In order to have either of these feasibly indiscernable, the network needs to set a discretization threshold - a Δt For each "Δt", the encoding sequence is discretized, for example if a 10-second pulse sequence is composed of 10 1-second pulses then the Δt might be 0.5 seconds. This means that any sequence whose pulses lie within ±0.5 s of their intended place in the sequence are interpreted as correct. Hence only those pulses that are not activated in the intended time (or are pressed multiple times) are marked as incorrect. Hence a received pulse signal is compared piece-wise to a "binned" histogram of the requested pulse sequence, the signal itself is not reported to the user, just the result of this test in the form of green flashes (synchronous pulses) and red flashes (missed/asynchronous pulses). This pattern becomes the private key. All nodes that are in sync share a single private key of green pulses encoded at the requested frequency and modulation. However, all pulses that fail the encoding are immediately recognisable and miners can offer customised 'block-lists' of pulse-generators that are dissonant or 'allow-lists' of pulse-generators that maximise their resonance. Maximal resonance occurs when multiple correct signals correlate not just in their local synchrony (all pulses correct within Δt) but also within the global synchrony - arriving in sync with other neighbours. Δx Networks also define a spatial discretization threshold (Δx) such that nodes that are approximately equi-distant from some central node, will receive that central node's transmissions at precisely the same time. * Bob sends a request signal (001001010110101) and awaits response. * Alice at point (-10,0) km emits her attempted pulsing of the requested signal to Bob at point (0,0) km. * Charlie at point (10,0) km has also emitted their attempted pulsing of the signal to Bob. * If both achieve a perfect transmission (no errors) then Bob receives both signals at the same time and all three gain a resonance reward. If Δx is defined to be small, then slight changes in the positions of the three can affect the result. For example, if Bob is just 0.2 km closer to Alice than Charlie, then he will receive Alice's signal first by some small time fraction Δt=Δx/v (where 'v' is the velocity of the signal). Higher-Dimensions Signals are no longer a binary oscillation, but can take more symbolic freedom (e.g. *@$!}s2F@!XSA)). Hence the public key can become more clearly distinguishable, by simply having a trigger phrase e.g. "PUBKEY=" which precedes it (as in "PUBKEY=2939"). Any way you want to do it is fine, but having such obvious public encryption could invite attackers. So one might perform a simple encoding trick like "9392=YEKBUP" to conceal the meaning. The set of encoding 'tricks' can be shared amongst trusted members of your network, and when nodes are found to create dissonance, their access to the updated encoded list can be revoked and standards immediately changed to exclude them. These decisions are made through a consensus forking, whereby any miner or node can offer a chain-fork that updates the member list to exclude that node and any members that then continue that forked-chain will then be developing a stake in it, if the fork is successful then it will attract more nodes to follow it and end up being the longest chain.[[Category:Chaos] Category:Anarchism Category:Nanoeconomics Category:Nanodemocracy Category:Polylegality